Abstract-Cloud computing enables users (clients) to outsource large volume of their data to cloud servers. Secure distributed cloud storage schemes ensure that multiple servers store these data in a reliable and untampered fashion. We propose an idea to construct such a scheme for static data by encoding data blocks (using error-correcting codes) and then attaching authentication information (tags) to these encoded blocks. We identify some challenges while extending this idea to accommodate append-only data. Then, we propose our secure distributed cloud storage scheme for append-only data that addresses the challenges efficiently. The main advantage of our scheme is that it enables the servers to update the parity blocks themselves. Moreover, the client need not download any data (or parity) block to update the tags of the modified parity blocks residing on the servers. Finally, we analyze the security and performance of our scheme.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cloud service providers offer storage outsourcing facility to their users (clients) who can upload large amount of data to the cloud servers and can later read their data as often as needed. However, as a client (data owner) stores only some metadata for the data file she uploads, the file might get corrupted at the cloud servers, thus making it unavailable at some point of time. Moreover, a malicious cloud server can delete some of the client's data to save space and still claim that it has stored the data properly. Secure cloud storage schemes address this problem where the client (or a third party auditor) checks the availability of the file uploaded on the remote server. These schemes typically use concepts of provable data possession (PDP) and proofs of retrievability (POR) that are introduced by Ateniese et al. [1] and Juels and Kaliski [2] , respectively. Such schemes employ an auditing mechanism where the client executes a challenge-response protocol (with the remote server) to check the integrity of her outsourced data file. POR schemes preserve the integrity of the entire data file. The retrievability guarantee for all data blocks of the outsourced file can be achieved by encoding the original file with an error-correcting code (ECC) before authenticating (and uploading) the blocks of the encoded file [3] . However, due to involvement of ECCs, POR schemes [3] , [4] are less efficient than PDP schemes [1] , [5] , [6] in general.
Storage servers in practice are prone to adversarial corruptions and hardware outages [7] . Therefore, the client's data are often distributed to multiple storage servers in order to increase the degree of reliability [8] , [9] . Error-correcting codes are used extensively to design distributed storage systems as they provide optimal storage overhead to achieve the same reliability compared to other techniques [10] . Schwarz and Miller [11] exploit algebraic signatures along with errorcorrecting codes to construct a secure distributed storage where data blocks in random locations are challenged to check the integrity of the client's data. These algebraic signatures can be aggregated into a single signature that reduces the communication overhead.
Bowers et al. [12] propose a secure distributed cloud storage scheme called HAIL (high-availability and integrity layer for cloud storage) that achieves POR guarantees. Encoding of the data blocks of a file is done in two steps: across multiple servers (dispersal code) and within each server (server code). HAIL enjoys several benefits such as: high reliability, low per-server computation and bandwidth (comparable to single-server POR schemes) and strong adversarial model. Moreover, message authentication codes (MACs) are embedded in the parity blocks -that reduces the storage overhead on the servers. However, HAIL deals with static data (that cannot be modified once uploaded to the servers). Extending HAIL for dynamic data is left as a future work in [12] .
Although generic dynamic data (supporting arbitrary insertions, deletions and modifications) are useful, appendonly data find numerous applications as well. These primarily include archival data from different sources where data are appended to the existing datasets. For example, data obtained from closed circuit television camera, monetary transactions in banks, medical history of a patient -all must be kept intact with append being the only possible update. Append-only data are also useful for maintaining other log structures (e.g., in certificate transparency schemes [13] ). Extending HAIL for append-only data requires the client to download all the parity blocks making the scheme inefficient (see Section VII).
Our Contribution Our contributions in this work are summarized as follows.
-We propose a secure distributed cloud storage scheme for static data that borrows the basic storage structure from HAIL. Our scheme offers POR guarantees. We define a security model for distributed cloud storage schemes. Unlike HAIL, an adversary in our scheme cannot modify a dispersal codeword without being detected by the client.
-We extend our scheme for static data to accommodate append-only data. In our scheme for append-only data, individual servers can update their parity blocks (required for an append) without any intervention of the client.
-For an append, the client in our scheme need not download any parity (or data) block to recompute the authentication tags corresponding to the (updated) parity blocks. She sends only the relevant changes in these tags to the servers.
-We use systematic Cauchy Reed-Solomon codes in our scheme for static data and propose a technique to extend such codes to accommodate new symbols appended to the existing message symbols. The corresponding updates on the parity symbols do not touch existing message symbols. The construction of such an extendable code might be useful in other applications as well.
-We provide a prototype implementation of our scheme for append-only data and report the experimental results.
II. PRELIMINARIES

A. Notation
Let λ be the security parameter. An algorithm A(1 λ ) is a probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) algorithm if its running time is polynomial in λ and its output is a random variable which depends on the internal coin tosses of A. An element a chosen from a set S uniformly at random is denoted as a 
B. Error-Correcting Codes
An (n, k, d) Σ -error-correcting code consists of an encoding algorithm Enc: Σ k → Σ n (encodes a message consisting of k symbols into a longer codeword consisting of n symbols) and a decoding algorithm Dec: 
we call the code a maximum distance separable (MDS) code. We often specify the parameters of an MDS code by denoting it as an (n, k)-MDS code, where Σ is implicit and the minimum distance d = n−k+1. Reed-Solomon codes [14] and their extensions are examples of non-trivial linear MDS codes.
Let the message consist of k symbols m 1 , m 2 , . . . , m k from a finite field F (considered as a column vector of dimension k). Then, the classical Reed-Solomon coding employs an n×k Vandermonde matrix as the distribution matrix over F. For encoding, the message vector is multiplied with the distribution matrix to obtain another column vector (codeword) consisting of n symbols m 1 , m 2 , . . . , m n from F. Moreover, if the code is systematic, the first k symbols of the codeword are same as the k symbols of the message. As any k×k submatrix of the Vandermonde matrix is invertible, the original message can be decoded using any k out of the n symbols of the codeword (for a Reed-Solomon erasure code).
III. ERROR-CORRECTING CODES USED IN OUR CONSTRUCTIONS
In our constructions of a secure distributed cloud storage, we use Cauchy Reed-Solomon coding that is a variant of the Reed-Solomon coding. In this section, we briefly discuss Cauchy Reed-Solomon codes over the finite field Z p for a prime p. Then, we discuss how to extend a Cauchy ReedSolomon distribution matrix to accommodate new message symbols appended to the end of current symbols.
A. Cauchy Reed-Solomon Code
For an (n, k)-Cauchy Reed-Solomon (CRS) code [15] , the distribution matrix is an n×k matrix M CRS over Z p , where the submatrix consisting of the first k rows is a k×k identity matrix and the submatrix consisting of the last s = n − k rows is an s × k Cauchy matrix. An s × k Cauchy matrix (k + s ≤ p) is constructed in the following way. Let X = {x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x s } and Y = {y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y k } be two sets such that:
The s × k Cauchy matrix defined by X and Y consists of the entries
The distribution matrix M CRS has the property that any k × k submatrix is invertible. The encoding and decoding procedures for Cauchy Reed-Solomon (CRS) coding are same as those of the classical Reed-Solomon coding, except that M CRS (instead of the Vandermonde matrix) is used as the distribution matrix.
B. Extending M CRS for Appending Message Symbols
Let an n × k matrix M CRS defined by X = {x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x s } and Y = {y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y k } be the distribution matrix for an (n, k)-CRS code over Z p , where the first k rows form a k × k identity matrix I k and the last s = n−k rows form an s×k Cauchy matrix (n = k+s ≤ p). The codeword is obtained by multiplying M CRS with the
Suppose we have to accommodate another symbol m k+1 at the end of the message vector − → m. To achieve this, we append another column to the right of M CRS . If we want to keep the parameter n unchanged, the number of parity symbols s decreases; that is, we set the parameters k and s with values k new = k + 1 and s new = s − 1, respectively. However, this reduces the number of parity blocks in the codeword by 1 for every append in − → m that is not desirable. On the other hand, if we want to keep s unchanged, the number of codeword-symbols n increases; that is, we set k new = k +1 and n new = n +1 with the restriction n new ≤ p. We describe the latter case that we use in our construction.
We choose an element y ∈ Z p such that y ∈ X and y ∈ Y . We set y knew = y k+1 = y. Then, we construct an s × k new Cauchy matrix that consists of the entries
We note that all of the entries in this matrix need not be computed afresh. We simply append a column to the previous s×k Cauchy matrix where a iknew = 1 xi−y knew for every row indexed by i. The matrix thus formed is indeed a Cauchy matrix as it satisfies all the conditions mentioned in Section III-A. Finally, this matrix is appended to the identity matrix I k+1 to obtain the updated distribution matrix M CRS .
IV. OVERVIEW OF A SECURE DISTRIBUTED CLOUD STORAGE
In this section, we define a secure distributed cloud storage scheme. We assume that there are total n servers the client (data owner) wants to distribute her data file F among. Out of these n servers, she allots k primary servers to store the data blocks of F and s = n − k secondary (parity or redundant) servers to store the parity (or redundant) blocks. Let the servers be denoted by S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S n , where the first k servers S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S k are the primary servers and the rest are the secondary servers. Encoding (and decoding) of the data blocks are done row-wise (interserver) and column-wise (intra-server) using Cauchy ReedSolomon (CRS) codes. Authentication tags are attached to some of these blocks in order to detect anomaly when the client audits her data distributed among the servers. After the client initially uploads her file to the servers, the lifetime of the system is split into some time intervals called epochs. In each epoch, a set of servers can behave maliciously and corrupt the respective storage (see Section V). We denote by F t the state of F stored on the servers in the t-th epoch.
We define a secure distributed cloud storage scheme for append-only data in Definition 1. A secure distributed cloud storage scheme for static data consists of these procedures except the procedure Append. 
V. SECURITY MODEL
We assume that a client (cloud user) wants to distribute her data file F among n servers. She chooses k primary servers S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S k to store the data blocks of F and s = n − k secondary (or redundant) servers S (k+1) , S (k+2) , . . . , S n to store the parity (or redundant) blocks. Data blocks are encoded row-wise (inter-server or dispersal code) and column-wise (intra-server or server code) using CRS codes.
After encoding the data file F , the client initially uploads this processed file to the servers. The lifetime of the system is split into some time intervals called epochs [12] . A probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) adversary A is modeled as malicious (i.e., in each epoch it can corrupt any number of servers chosen arbitrarily, and it can modify or delete any part of the storage in any server it corrupts). An epoch consists of four phases: an append phase (the client appends data blocks to the existing file residing on the servers), a corruption phase (A chooses a set of servers to corrupt), an audit phase (the client challenges the servers via spot checking) and a remediation phase (the client checks if some corrupted servers provide incorrect responses above a certain threshold fraction q ). In the remediation phase, if the fraction of corruptions exceeds q for some server, the client reads all the file-shares from each server and tries to decode the original file F .
A secure distributed cloud storage scheme (for static or append-only data) satisfies the following properties. We refer to the full version [16] (of this work) for the formal security definition. The property freshness is applicable only for append-only data where up-to-date blocks need to be retained by the servers. 1) Authenticity The authenticity property requires that the cloud servers cannot produce valid proofs during audits without storing the corresponding blocks untampered, except with some probability negligible in λ.
2) Freshness For append-only data, the client can append new data blocks to the existing data blocks. Moreover, as we will see later in our scheme, appending new data blocks might require updating some of the (parity) blocks. However, a malicious server may discard these changes and keep an old copy of these blocks. Thus, the client must be convinced that the servers have stored the up-to-date blocks.
3) Retrievability Retrievability of data requires that, given a PPT adversary A (possibly corrupting a set of servers) that responds correctly to a challenge Q with some nonnegligible probability, there exists a polynomial-time extractor algorithm E that can extract all data blocks of the file (except with negligible probability) by challenging A for a polynomial (in λ) number of times and verifying its responses. The algorithm E has a black-box rewinding access to A. Authenticity and freshness of data restrict the adversary A to produce valid responses (without storing the authentic and up-to-date data) during these interactions only with some negligible probability.
VI. SECURE DISTRIBUTED CLOUD STORAGE FOR STATIC DATA
In this section, we construct a secure distributed cloud storage scheme for static data and analyze the security of the scheme. Let n (total number of servers) and k (number of primary servers) be system parameters that are passed as inputs to the procedures of our scheme. The audit phase involves the procedures Challenge, Prove and Verify. We note that the client constructs two distribution matrices M CRS and M CRS to encode blocks of the data file F rowwise and column-wise, respectively. We denote the state of F in the t-th epoch by F t . We refer to the full version [16] (of this work) for the security proof, probabilistic guarantees and decoding techniques.
A. Our Scheme for Static Data
Our secure distributed cloud storage scheme for static data consists of the following procedures. F as {m ij } i∈ [1,k] ,j∈ [1,k] , where each data block Fig. 1 gives an overview of the storage structure for F distributed among the primary and the secondary servers. For each primary server S j (j ∈ [1, k]), the client encodes the data blocks m 1j , m 2j , . . . , mk j using an (r,k) systematic CRS code to forms = r−k parity blocks m (k+1)j , m (k+2)j , . . . , m rj (with the help of an r×k matrix M CRS where r ≤ p). After processing the blocks of the primary servers, the client computes the parity blocks for the secondary servers as follows. For each row i ∈ [1, r], the client uses an (n, k) systematic CRS code to encode the blocks m i1 , m i2 , . . . , m ik into s = n − k parity blocks
The client computes authentication tags (in a similar way as [3] ) for the blocks as follows. For each block m ij (where i ∈ [1, r] and j ∈ [1, n]), she generates a tag
Finally, the client sends {(m ij , σ ij )} i∈ [1,r] to the j-th server S j for each j ∈ [1, n].
-Challenge(fid, l, r, t): During the audit phase in the t-th epoch, the client selects I, a random l-element subset of [1, r] and generates a challenge set Q = {(i, ν i )} i∈I , where each ν i R ← − Z p . Then, the client sends Q to all the servers. -Prove(Q, F t , fid, t): Upon receiving the challenge set Q = {(i, ν i )} i∈I , the j-th cloud server S j computes
and sends them to the client (for all j ∈ [1, n]). The responses from all the servers constitute the proof Π.
-Verify(Q, Π, fid, sk, t): Using Q = {(i, ν i )} i∈I and the proof Π sent by the servers, the client checks whether
for each j ∈ [1, n] . If any of the equalities does not hold, she outputs 0. Otherwise, the client outputs 1.
-Redistribute(fid, sk, t, F t , q ): During the t-th epoch, if the client detects that the fraction (with respect to |Q|) of corruption exceeds q for some server, the client reads all the shares of the (possibly corrupted) file from all the servers, tries to recover F (by decoding the file-shares of F t ) and distributes new shares to the servers. These distributed file-shares constitute the new state (F t+1 ) of the file. If the decoding procedure fails (that is, the client cannot recover F ), the file is considered to be unavailable.
VII. SECURE DISTRIBUTED CLOUD STORAGE FOR APPEND-ONLY DATA
We start with an idea for possible extension of our scheme for static data in order to support append operations and describe some of its challenges. Then, we propose our secure distributed cloud storage for append-only data that addresses these challenges efficiently. We note that extending HAIL [12] for append-only data suffers from two issues stated as follows.
-HAIL uses an adversarial server code [4] that is computationally heavy (due to the use of pseudorandom permutations and encryptions). For each append, parity blocks need to be decrypted (using a secret key of the client), recomputed and permuted (using another secret key of the client). This requires the client to download all parity blocks for each server.
-Parity blocks (dispersal code) cannot be extracted from the MACs without knowing the client's secret keys. Thus, even if a classical ECC were used (instead of an adversarial code), the client would have had to download all such parity blocks (in order to update the corresponding MACs) for each append.
A. Our Idea for Extension
We assume that the client appends a row of data blocks at a time, that is, each server gets a block-tag pair during an append as shown in Fig. 2 . The client encodes the new k blocks into n blocks using M CRS , generates tags for these blocks and distributes them among the servers. Then, column-wise parity blocks are updated using M CRS for each server. The client uses two pairs of sets (X row , Y row ) and (X col , Y col ) each satisfying the conditions mentioned in Section III-A. We note that X row and Y row are fixed unless we change the number of primary servers or the number of secondary servers. On the other hand, for column-wise CRS coding using M CRS , the set Y col needs to be changed as discussed in Section III-B. For each server, the columnwise parity blocks need to be updated depending on the block newly appended to that server.
1) Challenges:
We discuss about some challenges regarding the proposed idea as follows.
(a) For row-wise (or column-wise) CRS coding, the client needs to store the matrices M CRS (or M CRS ) to encode data blocks. Alternatively, the client can store only the Cauchy matrices to reduce the storage overhead. This overhead can be further alleviated if the client stores only the pairs A scheme following our basic idea discussed above suffers from the following attack. Letk be the number of data blocks (systematic part) present in the columnwise codeword before the t-th append. We fix a row-index i ∈ [k + 2, r] and a column-index j ∈ [1, n] . Let (m ij , σ ij ) and (m ij , σ ij ) be the block-tag pairs for the i-th block of the j-th server S j before and after the t-th append, respectively. So, we have
Therefore, a (possibly) malicious secondary server S j can compute f k prf (i, j) and α using m ij , m ij , σ ij and σ ij ; and thus it can later generate a valid tag on its i-th block. (c) In column-wise CRS coding, for each server, the parity blocks need to be updated depending on the new block appended. Thus, for each server, the client needs to download all parity blocks, update them (and their corresponding tags) using the updated M CRS and upload them to that server. This requires a huge client-server communication bandwidth.
2) Addressing the Challenges: We describe some remedial measures in order to address the challenges discussed above.
(a) We note that the elements in X row and Y row belong to Z p , where |X row | = s and |Y row | = k. We include the first s elements of Z p in X row and the last k elements of
We can easily verify that X row and Y row thus formed indeed satisfy the conditions mentioned in Section III-A as long as n = k + s ≤ p. So the knowledge of i ∈ [1, s] and j ∈ [1, k] is sufficient to get the entries of X row , Y row and to compute the entries a ij of M CRS on-the-fly. So, the client need not store these sets which can be formed using the same technique, except that |Y col | varies withk. (b) The client uses a counter ctr. For the initial upload, the client sets the counter ctr to 0 and computes tags
for all i ∈ [1, r] and for all j ∈ [1, n] . For each append, the client increments ctr by 1 and updates the tags
only for i ∈ [k + 1, r] and j ∈ [1, n] , where m ij (or σ ij ) is the value of the updated column-wise parity block (or the updated tag for that parity block). We note that, for the firstk rows (systematic part), the tags corresponding to blocks (data or parity) in the servers never get updated (as the only operation allowed is append in thek + 1-th row). Therefore, at any point of time, the value of ctr is 0 for the firstk rows and the value of ctr for the rest of the rows is the number of appends that have taken place so far. Let
and ctr > ctr. Now, due to the properties of a pseudorandom function, the j-th server S j (j ∈ [1, n]) cannot exploit the knowledge of σ ij and σ ij to compute the value(
and for any ctr > ctr.
(c) For column-wise CRS coding, each server can maintain the updated M CRS (or it can compute the entries of M CRS on-the-fly as discussed above) and update its parity blocks using M CRS . This requires no client-server communication.
updates each of its column-wise parity blocks as follows. Letk a be the number of data blocks (systematic part) present in the column-wise codeword after the q-th append and mk a j be the newly appended data block for S j . Let m ij and m ij be the contents of the i-th parity block (i ∈ [k a + 1, r]) of S j before and after the q-th append, respectively. The server S j multiplies mk a j with the i-th entry of the newly addedk a -th column of the Cauchy submatrix of M CRS (we refer to Section III-B for details). Then, it adds this product to m ij in order to get m ij , the updated content of the parity block. We note that S j need not touch any existing data blocks m ij (i ∈ [1,k a − 1]) to update its parity blocks.
On the other hand, for each server, the authentication tags on the lasts = r −k (column-wise parity) blocks need to be updated with the latest value of i and ctr (both are incremented by 1 after an append). We describe the procedure for updating the authentication tag of such a block for S j (j ∈ [1, n]) as follows. Let (mk a j , σk a j ) be the new block-tag pair to be appended to S j when the client encodes thek a -th row using row-wise encoding. Let (m ij , σ ij ) and (m ij , σ ij ) be the block-tag pairs for the i-th block (i ∈ [k a +1, r]) of S j before and after the q-th append, respectively. Therefore, we have
As row-wise and column-wise codes used are linear codes, it is not hard to see that the content of the i-th block of S j (i ∈ [k a + 1, r], j ∈ [1, n] ) is the same irrespective of whether we get it by column-wise-then-row-wise encoding or by row-wise-then-column-wise encoding. This crucial observation leads us to the fact that Δ m can be computed solely from mk a j and M CRS as Δ m = mk a j M CRS [i,k a ] mod p. Thus, we have
The client sends only these Δ σ 's for all relevant parity blocks to the servers, and the servers update the respective authentication tags stored at their end accordingly. Hence, the client need not download the updated column-wise parity blocks to recompute their authentication tags using Eqn. 5.
B. Scheme for Append-only Data
We now describe the procedures of our secure distributed cloud storage for append-only data. The procedures Setup, Challenge, Prove and Redistribute in our scheme for append-only data are same as those described for static data. We refer to the full version [16] (of this work) for the security proof.
-Outsource(F, sk): The procedure is same as the procedure Outsource described in Section VI-A except the following. Instead of using Eqn. 1, the client computes an authentication tag for each block using Eqn. 4 for i ∈ [1, r] and j ∈ [1, n] . The client and each of the servers initialize the values of ctr stored at their end to be 0.
-Append(fid, sk,k, r, ctr, t): Let the client want to append k data blocks to the data file F during the t-th epoch. The client increments each ofk, r and ctr by 1 and updates M CRS . She encodes k data blocks (the row to be appended) into n blocks using M CRS , generates tags
for all j ∈ [1, n] , and sends the blocks and the tags to the corresponding n servers (see Fig. 2 ). The servers append the respective blocks (and tags), increment each ofk, r and ctr they maintain by 1 and update M CRS at their end. Each of the servers updates its column-wise parity blocks using M CRS . For each server, the client also computes the changes in the existing tags by taking t = ctr andk a =k in Eqn. 6 and sends them to the servers. The servers update the tags on the existing column-wise parity blocks accordingly.
-Verify(Q, Π, fid, sk, ctr,k, t): The procedure is same as the procedure Verify described in Section VI-A except the following. Instead of using Eqn. 3, the client 
VIII. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
We have implemented our secure distributed cloud storage scheme for append-only data in order to measure its efficiency. We have run our experiments on a 3.6 GHz Intel Core i5-680 processor. To encode the data blocks of F , we use the Jerasure library (version 1.2) [17] . Rowwise CRS encoding uses the distribution matrix M CRS . We have run our experiments on total n = 15 servers (k = 9 primary servers and s = 6 secondary servers). Column-wise encoding uses the matrix M CRS . We use (255, 243)-CRS encoding over GF [2 8 ] and (65535, 65523)-CRS encoding over GF [2 16 ]. For PRF calculations, we use a cryptographically secure pseudorandom number generator (CPRNG) whose seed is dependent on the index of the respective server and the particular row number of a block.
F is split into blocks of size 4 KB. Each of the servers contains several disks each of size 2 w × 4 KB. After filling a disk, column-wise parity blocks are computed for that disk. We note that an append at the end of previous data blocks affects only the last disk in each server. As arithmetic operations in Z p are expensive, we further split each block into chunks each of which is of length w bits (w = 8 or w = 16). Thus, all the arithmetic operations for row-wise (or column-wise) encoding are done efficiently in GF [2 w ]. We have run experiments to calculate the time required for different phases in our scheme. We vary parameters such as file size |F | (1-5 GB), query size |Q| (100-1000) and number of failed nodes (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) . We mention that the reported timing measures also include the time required for disk I/Os and reads (and writes) on the disks. Fig. 3 depicts the encoding time for varying |F | which includes the total time for row-wise and column-wise encodings. In our experiments, we have takens = 12 for both w = 8 and w = 16. The encoding time increases for larger s (due to computation of more parity blocks in each server code). Fig. 4 shows the tag generation time for varying |F |. We note that, for a fixed file size, the number of chunks in each block for w = 8 is greater than that for w = 16; and for every chunk in a block, the client computes a PRF value. Thus, the client has to compute more PRF values for w = 8. Fig. 5 and Fig. 6 show the time for proof generation (server side) and proof verification (client side) when the file size increases. Here, we keep the query size constant (500). On the other hand, Fig. 7 and Fig. 8 show the time required for proof generation and proof verification when the size of a query increases. Here, we keep the file size constant (1 GB). We note that generating and verifying a proof take O(|Q|) computations and they are independent of |F |. As we have mentioned earlier, the client (and the server) has to compute more PRF values for w = 8 compared to w = 16. Fig. 9 depicts the reconstruction time for different |F | when a single node fails. We report the reconstruction time for multiple (up to s = 6) node failures in Fig. 10 (for a file of size 1 GB). The time for reconstruction includes the time for decoding. Fig. 11 shows the time required to append rows to the servers.
IX. CONCLUSION
In this work, we have proposed a secure distributed cloud storage scheme for static data that achieves POR guarantees. We have presented a technique to extend a systematic Cauchy Reed-Solomon code in order to append new symbols (without reading the existing message symbols). We have used this technique to extend our secure distributed cloud storage scheme (for static data) in order to accommodate append-only data. We have analyzed the security and performance of our scheme. ACKNOWLEDGMENT This project has been made possible in part by a gift from the NetApp University Research Fund, a corporate advised fund of Silicon Valley Community Foundation.
